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Corruption, Governance and Economic Growth: Insights from Sub-Saharan Africa 
Abstract 
Purpose - The general objective of this study is to investigate the impact of governance 
indices (especially control of corruption) on economic growth in some selected Sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) countries for the period 2002 to 2009. Specifically, the study attempts to 
assess whether governance reforms (especially those relating to control of corruption) have 
any impact on the economic growth in SSA countries. It also examines whether simultaneous 
policy reforms have any impact on economic growth in the region.  
Design/Methodology/Approach – The governance indices used in this study were drawn from 
the PRS Group and the World Governance Indicators for the period of 2002 to 2009 while the 
real GDP per capita growth data were obtained from the World Bank Database. The study 
covered forty-seven Sub-Saharan African countries and it adopted the panel data framework, 
the fixed effect, the random effect and the maximum likelihood estimation techniques for the 
analyses.  
Findings - The study found that political stability and regulatory quality indices have growth 
enhancing features, as they impact on economic growth in the region significantly, while 
government effectiveness impacts negatively on the economic growth in the region. Despite 
several anti-corruption policies in the region, the impact of corruption control on economic 
growth is not very obvious.  The study also found that simultaneous implementation of 
accountability and rule of law indicators has more positive impact on economic growth in the 
region. Both policies are complementary, and hence can be pursued simultaneously. 
 
Research Implications - The results suggest that reform efforts that aim at enhancing 
accountability, regulatory quality, political stability and the rule of law have more growth 
enhancing features and thus should be given more priority, than reform efforts that singly 
address the issue of control of corruption, since corruption in the region tends to be endemic, 
systemic and ubiquitous.  
 
Originality/Value – Many previous studies attempt to see the impact of corruption on 
economies, but this paper tries to assess the reform efforts, governance indices as they impact 
on economic growth in the most vulnerable region of the world, the Sub-Saharan Africa.   
Besides, the study adopts the panel data framework which makes it possible to allow for 
differences in the form of unobservable individual country effects. The use of this unique 
framework is uncommon in the current corruption-governance-growth literature. 
 Keywords:  Governance, Economic Growth, Sub-Saharan Africa, Panel Data Framework 
JEL CLASSOFICATION:   G28, O40 ,055 , C23 
 
Introduction  
Aggregate economic performance in Sub-Saharan Africa during the past decade has remained 
unsatisfactory, in contrast to robust performance of other developing countries elsewhere. 
This unsatisfactory performance has been attributed to a number of factors which can be 
classified into two, exogenous and endogenous factors. The external or exogenous factors 
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include global financial crisis, unfavourable terms of trade, among others, while the internal 
or endogenous  shocks  include inappropriate and inconsistent policy regimes, corruption, 
ethnic conflicts and protracted civil wars, political instability, adverse security conditions, 
and complex administrative and institutional frameworks  and weak institutions etc. All  the 
endogenous or internal factors are often related to governance issues. 
 
For many SSA countries, the effects of these adverse external developments have been 
compounded, by the weak governance structure in the region and central to these problems is 
the issue of corruption. Corruption has become an endemic problem in the region with its 
attendant negative impact on the regional economic performance.  
In many developing countries, especially the sub-Saharan countries (SSA), governance has 
been a great challenge in harnessing domestic investment (at least from private sector) and 
attracting foreign inflows for growth. This is further worsened by long history of poor and 
bad governance.  Akanbi (2010) supported this position when he asserted  that poor 
governance  which is reflected in the unstable political environment in many African 
countries has been a major hindrance to increasing domestic investment over the years. 
 
However, since early 21
st
 century the attention and focus of policy makers, government and 
international funding agencies is on how to improve and strengthen governance in  many 
countries so as to  attract  foreign investment, aids and debt forgiveness and enhance 
international economic relations. All the aforementioned  are sometimes tied to level of 
governance, this couple with the fact that  governance  is posited to have impact on economic 
growth further exacerbates increasing pressure on many governments to  focus  on how to  
improve their governance measures or   policy reforms so as to enhance economic growth 
and development. 
This paper thus focuses mainly on impacts of   governance indicators (especially control of 
corruption, rule of law, accountability, regulatory quality, government effectiveness and 
political stability) on the economic performance in the region, or precisely can we argue that 
a better governance structure that promotes accountability and reduce corruption can enhance 
the economic performance of the zone. 
  
However, the debate on the effects of political corruption on economic activity is still 
inconclusive in the literature. While many argued that corruption hurts economic 
development because it redirects resources in unproductive direction and instils distortions in 
the economy. For example, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) identify four channels through which 
corruption may have an adverse effect on economic growth: higher public investment, lower 
government revenues, lower expenditures on business operations and maintenance, and lower 
quality of public infrastructure. Mauro (1995) also argues that corruption adversely affect 
economic growth through distortion in investment flow. However, Leff (1964), Hutington ( 
1968) have argued that corruption may serve as an efficient grease in enhancing  productive 
services in an economy with highly complex bureaucratic bottlenecks. Collier (1997) also 
argues that in a corrupt nation,  the expectation for corrupt practices is high, and that can lead 
to a stable corrupt equilibrium state, and when a nation is in that state, it requires more 
articulate reform efforts  to return such countries to normal position. 
 
Corruption has been  identified as an ubiquitous social problem across all the regions of the 
world but its preponderance is found in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) due to lack of willingness 
and sincerity on the part of the national governments within the region, poverty level of its 
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citizenry and underdevelopment (Richards et al., 2003). Also, most of the SSA countries are 
characterised by low Gross National Income per Capita, low life expectancy, low literacy 
level, lack of access to improved water and, above all, lack of transparency and 
accountability (Kofele-Kale, 2006; World Development Indicators, 2009).  
Kofele-Kale (2006) has highlighted the business culture of Africa as lacking transparency and 
accountability and compromising democratic institutions. Also, based on the historical 
context of the fight against corruption in post-colonial Africa, he concluded that the 
contemporary efforts by African governments to build a corruption free society lack in their 
degree of adequacy, seriousness and appropriateness and sufficiency. Undoubtedly such 
situations have led to the region’s abysmal aggregate economic performance (Kofele-Kale, 
2006). 
 
Although there exist differences in the definition and understanding of the term corruption 
due to differences in cultural, social, religious and legal settings, this study perceives 
corruption in its broad sense to include any intentional action or inaction that accords an 
undeserved benefit to a person or group such that the integrity and accountability of the 
perpetrator or the institution they represent are undermined. Corruption can be perpetrated at 
individual level (private corruption), organisational level (corporate corruption) and 
government level (political corruption). While studies relating to personal and organisational 
corruptions are predominantly found in psychology, sociology and management disciplines, 
experts in the field of economics, political science and law have taken the lead in analysing 
political corruption.   
Some of the studies that focussed on corporate corruption have concentrated on different 
aspects. These include: different forms of corporate corrupt practices (Wu, 2009), the spread 
and dynamics of corporate corruption (Nieuwenboer and Kaptein, 2008), underlying 
institutional processes of corporate corruption (Richards et al., 2003), causes of corporate 
corruption (Trevino and Weaver, 2003; Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Vardi and Weitz, 2004; 
Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2008) and impacts of corporate corruption (Kimuyu, 2007). 
However, the focus of this current study is political corruption which has been described as 
the abuse or misuse of public offices, resources, obligations or duties for private (personal or 
sectional) gain (Szeftel, 1998; 2000). This study therefore attempts to examine the effect of  
control of political corruption and other governance indicators on the economic growth of 
SSA countries with a view to making policy recommendations. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows; section 2 has the review of relevant literature, 
section 3 gives the research methodology and data sources. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results; section 5 gives the policy implications and suggestion for further research while 
section 6 contains the conclusion.  
 
Literature Review 
Cases of political corruption are very common in all the regions of the world. As such, 
corruption is now considered an important governance issue globally. However, due to the 
preponderance of autocracy, totalitarianism and disregard for the rule of law in the Sub-
Saharan Africa, the region has been the main focus of attention regarding this phenomenon. 
This section first reviews the relationship between corruption and governance as a 
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springboard to assessing current efforts of control of corruption on macroeconomic 
performance in the region.     
Corruption and Governance 
Most of the studies on the relationship between corruption and governance have focused on 
individual countries rather than regions. For instance, Choi (2007) examined the causality 
between governance structure (through network relationships supported by traditions and 
socio-cultural foundations) and administrative corruption in Japan. The study found that such 
structures aid maladministration and diminish public trust in governments. To reduce 
corruption and enhance governance effectiveness in Japan, the study recommended citizen 
participation and diversity management. 
Furthermore, according to Ngo (2008), economic rents are generated in China through the 
government’s rationing of production licenses, fixing of prices and imposition of trade quotas 
with a view to effect industrial plans and development priorities. In his investigation of the 
links between rent-seeking, economic governance and corruption in China, Ngo’s study 
concluded that rent-seeking is already intertwined with economic governance and it is being 
used in a corrupt way by agents of the government as they (the agents) collude with business 
handlers to accrue extra profits through bribery in areas such as construction works, property 
rights transfers, medical supplies, government procurements and exploration of natural 
resources. Ngo’s conclusion was corroborated by Gao’s (2011) study which showed that 
government interventions that create economic rent do lead to corruption. 
Commenting on the danger corruption constitutes to good governance in South Africa, Pillay 
(2004) stated that “South Africa’s complex political design is a contributing factor to the rise 
of corruption, which has adversely affected stability and trust and which has damaged the 
ethos of democratic values and principles”.  
Despite the foregoing studies that focused on individual countries vis-a-vis the link between 
corruption and governance, a few others adopted a multi-country approach. For example, 
based on data from 150 developing countries involving 72,000 firms, Gander (2011) 
developed “a simple model of a firm’s decision made under the uncertainty of the success of 
the bribe of a government official”. With this model, he concluded that political instability 
and the court system are two major factors fuelling corruption in these developing countries. 
Also, while analysing African politics from the perspectives of corruption and governance, 
Szeftel (1998) concluded that the governance agenda in the continent “tackles corruption as if 
it were the cause of democratic and development problems rather than a symptom or 
consequence of them. Thus it fails to address the deeper political and class forces which drive 
the politics of clientelism and corruption. And secondly, in their demonization of the state 
and determination to substitute themselves for the state to force adjustment through, the 
donors and international agencies undermine the institutional development needed to sustain 
a more democratic, transparent and accountable political system. The result is that the 
important institutional structures and principles they seek to mobilize against corruption are 
unlikely to take root.” 
Based on the studies reviewed above, it will be safe to state that, if left uncontrolled, 
corruption will greatly undermine good governance and bad governance provides a potent 
platform for corruption to thrive – a double edged sword whose grip rests firmly in the hands 
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of those in charge of state governance. If both governance and control of corruption are not 
effective, these may have implications for the economy. 
Corruption and Macro-Economic Activities 
The three main macroeconomic performance areas in which the effects of corruption have 
been studied in the current body of literature are economic growth, income distribution and 
foreign direct investment. As regards the impact of corruption on economic growth, most of 
the studies found that corruption inhibits economic growth through distortion of private 
investment (Mauro, 1995; 1996) and human capital accumulation (Mo, 2000). In addition to 
corruption, Mauro (1995) also examined the effects of other governance/institutional factors 
such as red tape, the efficiency of the judicial system, and variables of political stability on 
growth while Mo’s study emphasised the political instability variable as the most important 
channel through which corruption affects economic growth. 
 
Furthermore, Mobolaji and Omoteso (2009) investigated the impact of corruption and other 
governance/institutional factors on economic growth in some selected transitional economies 
for the period of 1990-2004 based on corruption indices and institutional variables drawn 
from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG – PRS) analysed through the panel data 
framework. The study’s results supported Mauro’s hypothesis that corruption has negative 
impact on growth in the transitional economies. 
 
Based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic growth, Blackburn et al. (2005) 
concluded that the relationship between corruption and economic development is negative  
also  Tanzi and Davoodi’s (1997) in a  cross-country study found that corruption raises public 
investment but decreases public productivity. Teles (2007) investigated the relationship 
among corruption, institutional quality and economic growth. This study further extended the 
Ehrlich and Lui’s (1999) endogenous growth model to identify the institutional conditions 
that may inhibit corruption and stimulate economic growth. The study’s results explained 
why some countries with a lot of corruption still grow at a high rate. 
 
Meon and Sekkat (2005) examined the relationship between the impact of corruption on 
growth and investment and the quality of governance in a sample of 63-71 countries between 
1970 and 1998. The study found a negative effect of corruption on both growth and 
investment, a result similar to those of related previous studies. However, the study also 
found that corruption has a negative impact on growth and this is independent of its impact 
on investment which differs depending on the quality of governance. The Study’s findings 
suggested that a weak rule of law, an inefficient government and political violence tend to 
worsen the negative impact of corruption on investment and that corruption slows the process 
of growth in countries suffering from a weak rule of law and an inefficient government. The 
study concludes that corruption not only impacts on growth through reduced accumulation of 
capital but also through other channels. The results of this study show that by reducing the 
levels of corruption, a country’s growth increases even if other aspects of governance remain 
poor.   
Gyimah-Brempong and Gyimah-Brempong’s (2006) study used panel data from 61 countries 
at various levels of economic development over a period of 20 years with a view to 
investigating regional differences in the impact of corruption on economic growth and 
income distribution. The results indicated that of the four regions examined, Africa had the 
largest impact, OECD and Asian countries have the lowest while Latin America has the 
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largest distributional impact. The study’s results were robust to various specifications, 
measures of corruption, measures of investment, as well as the conditioning variables. 
Notwithstanding the conclusions of the foregoing previous research works, not all empirical 
studies in the current literature have observed a negative relationship between corruption and 
FDI. Examples of studies that did not find such negative relationship are Hines (1995) and 
Henisz (2000). Similarly, Andres and Ramlogan-Doson (2011) found an inverse relationship 
between corruption and income inequality based on a panel data work carried out in Latin 
America.  
Furthermore, Swaleheen and Stansel (2007) attempted to extend the empirical literature on 
the relationship between corruption and economic growth by incorporating the impact of 
economic freedom. The study used an econometric model with two improvements on the 
previous literature: the model accounts for the fact that economic growth, corruption, and 
investment are jointly determined and the study includes economic freedom explicitly as an 
explanatory variable. The results of the study led to conclusions that contradicted the 
generally accepted view in the literature that corruption is harmful to growth. The study 
found that, ceteris paribus, corruption lowers growth when the economic agents have very 
few choices; however, if people face many choices, corruption helps growth by providing a 
way around government controls. 
The foregoing arguments and counter arguments on the relationship between corruption, 
governance and economic growth have continued to feature in economics literature for the 
best part of the last century and the debate still continues unabated till today. The following 
words of Gyimah-Brempong and Gyimah-Brempong’s (2006) provide an enlightening 
reasoning for the debate: “although it is generally accepted that corruption has a negative 
effect on income growth, there are some exceptions. Some countries combine high corruption 
with slow income growth or stagnation; others combine high rates of corruption with fast 
income growth...... For example China and Cote d’Ivoire are ranked as equally corrupt, yet 
while China records an outstanding growth rate, Cote d’Ivoire records a large negative 
growth rate. ”   
 
Within the context of a developing country, Bangladesh, Paul ‘s (2010) study found a 
positive relationship between corruption and economic growth as a result of individuals (with 
rising income) and burgeoning businesses fanning the flames of corruption in a bid to get 
their ways through moribund government bureaucratic systems often administered by 
neglected public officers. He concludes that, “while corruption does not foster growth, it 
greases the wheels of commerce in Bangladesh”.  
Using a combination of corruption countries-specific data and indices available from the 
World Bank, BIC, ICRG and the Transparent International, Blackburn et al. (2010) examined 
how corrupt practices through bribery and tax evasion consequent upon connivance between 
households and government officials. The study found that such corrupt practices stifle 
productive investments that could have fostered economic development. Blackburn et al. 
(2010) further contributed to the macroeconomic implications of bad governance as 
epitomised by high incidence of corruption.  
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Contrary to the work of Glaeser and Saks (2006) which used similar datasets on the United 
States, Johnson and Yamarik’s (2011) study found that corruption plays a significant and 
causal role in reducing economic growth and investment in the country. This result shows 
that neither the incidence of corruption nor its detrimental effect on growth is only a 
developing world’s problem; rather, it is a ubiquitous one. 
Adam Smith (1776) observed that commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in 
any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice; in which the people do not 
feel themselves secure in the possession of their property; in which the faith of contracts is 
not supported by law; and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly 
employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce 
and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state, in which there is not a certain 
degree of confidence in the justice of government. What this suggests is that, for any 
sustainable economic growth to occur, there must be high degree of confidence in governance 
measures. Thus, all the governance measures are supposed to positively impact on economic 
performance in these countries, while failure to observe these governance measures reduces 
investors’ trust and public confidence in the government as well as impact negatively on the 
economy. 
Finally, an important observation in the current literature on the corruption-development 
relationship is that the researches on the nexus at regional level is scarce, whereas it is 
expected that international managers and policy makers working at regional levels may be 
more interested in regional evidence. Moreover, recent studies have started to discover 
important relationships at the regional level of analysis. Examples of such studies are 
Guetet’s (2006) work that focused on the Middle East and North Africa, Mobolaji and 
Omoteso’s (2009) research focused on the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia and Gyimah-Brempong and Gyimah-Brempong’s (2006) work which examined 
the regional differences from a multi-continental dataset. However, without a single SSA 
country making the top 30 countries in the corruption perception index (Transparency 
International, 2011) coupled with governance problems that appear rampant in the region, 
there could not be a better region upon which to base an assessment of the impact of 
corruption and governance on economic growth, a research vacuum this study aims to 
address.  Specifically, the study attempts to (1) assess whether political corruption has any 
impact on the growth of the sample countries and (2) assess the impact of governance on 
economic growth in the region 
In summary, in the literature there are some studies that suggest that corruption impact  
negatively on economic growth (Mauro 1995)  others argue  that it could efficiently grease 
the wheel of commerce (Huntington 1968, Paul 2010). The literature documents weak 
governance significantly impacting on economic growth.  Thus, the study seeks to 
empirically investigate the control of corruption and other governance indicators on 
economic growth in the region. It further attempts to evaluate the simultaneous relationship 
between governance structure and corruption on economic growth in the region.  
 
Research Methods 
This section has three sub sections, model specification, estimation technique and data 
sources for the study.  
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The Model Specification 
The economic growth is represented by the real GDP per capita growth rate (y) and is 
assumed to be affected by the level of corruption control (COR) as well as other governance 
variables in the economy such as accountability (ACCT), rule of law (LAW), political 
stability and absence of violence (POSV), government effectiveness (EFF) and regulatory 
quality (REG). Thus, a simple growth model was specified where the economic growth is 
influenced by: 
y = f (COR, ACCT, LAW, POSV, EFF, REG). 
The model 
ΔYit = α0 + β1 CORit + εt        (1) 
ΔYit = α0 + β1  CORit + β2  ACCTit + β3  LAWit  + β4  POSVit  +β5  EFFit  
 +β6  REGit  + εt          (2) 
 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of the real GDP per capita, and the explanatory 
variables are control of corruption and other institutional/governance variables. This is 
similar to the estimation of Hodgson (2006) and Mobolaji and Omoteso (2009). From the 
above specification, the apriori theoretical expectation is that  β1   is expected to be  positive  
and statistically significant to imply that in the region control of  corruption has positive 
impact on growth, but if it is negative, it may suggest that control of corruption is suboptimal 
to be able to control the surge of the menace  and hence evidence for the efficient grease . 
An effective control of corruption measure should impact positively on the rate of growth of 
respective economies; hence we expect β1 to be positive and significant. All other governance 
variables are equally expected to be positive and statistically significant. 
 The model specifications in equations 1 and 2 above, attempt to test the validity of the first 
hypothesis. A necessary condition to conclude that control of corruption and other 
governance measures have an impact on the growth of these economies requires the 
coefficient of these variables to be statistically significant.  The sign of each coefficient 
suggests the direction of the relationship or effect, while the size give indication of the 
magnitude of the effect. The coefficient with the highest positive  or negative effect deserve 
closer attention, as this would indicate the highest growth enhancing measure (i.e with 
highest positive sign) which needs  to be pursued aggressively and the highest growth-
retarding measure (coefficient with highest negative sign) needs  to be analysed with the view 
to minimizing its impact or reviewing policies to address same ultimately. 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) have brought to fore in the literature the issue of simultaneous 
reforms agenda, where two policies are simultaneously taken together to address its ipacts on 
the dependent variable. Thus, this paper also investigated further by trying to assess the 
effectiveness of simultaneous policy reform efforts by interacting two governance measures 
and assess their impacts on growth in the region.  This is done by assessing the cross partial 
derivatives of the variables. If the results suggest that the value is positive, this may indicate 
that the two policies are complementary and thus can be simultaneously implemented. If they 
are negative, this may suggest that the variables are substitutes, and thus reform efforts need 
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to be sequenced in line with Mckinnon (1991) gradual and sequential rather than immediate 
and simultaneous implementations. In case they are not statistically significant, it may 
indicate policy ineffectiveness. Thus, the coefficients β5 and β6  in model  3 are expected to 
be significant to suggest policy effectiveness, and the signs would indicate complementarity 
or substitutability of policy reforms with its attendant effects.  
To test for the second hypothesis, 
ΔYit = α0 + β1  CORit + β2 LAWit + β3  POSVit  +β4  EFFit  + β5(ACCT*LAW)it   
+ β6( REG*COR)it  + β7 REGit  + εt.      (3)  
 
 Where the coefficients are significant, a further assessment of the impact of the simultaneous 
policy reforms of the two, the partial derivatives of the growth rate with respect to each of the 
governance indicators were introduced. This  allows us to assess the short-run effects of these 
governance measures on growth and to test the marginal effect of each feature on the growth 
of the economies of these countries:  
it 
it 
it 
 The study is a regional study for 47 Sub-Saharan African countries for period of 8 years, thus 
a panel econometric approach is adopted.  It is a micro-panel data framework. The choice of 
the panel data technique for this study was to make it possible to allow for differences in the 
form of unobservable individual country effects A panel study’s ability to control for 
individual heterogeneity as well as state and time-invariant variables makes it a superior 
technique to a time series or cross-sectional study (Baltagi, 1995). The framework also gives 
more informative data, more variability, less co-linearity among variables, more degree of 
freedom and more efficiency.  
In this study, the fixed effect (FE), the random effect (RE) and the Hausman-test (based on 
the difference between fixed and random effects estimators) were conducted. The fixed effect 
is appropriate because of the study’s focus on a specific set of countries (within the SSA) and 
its inference is limited to the behaviour of these sets of countries. Although FE is more 
appropriate, it is often observed that there are too many parameters in the model and thus the 
possibility of loss of degree of freedom that can be avoided by assuming that the individual 
effect is random. The RE model is an appropriate specification when drawing a sample out of 
a large population. The test revealed that the RE is the better estimation method. However, a 
maximum likelihood estimation method was also used to confirm the robustness of the 
model. 
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Data and Data Sources  
The governance indicators used in the study are six, these are the voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, Rule of law; control of corruption, Government 
effectiveness and Regulatory quality. The Voice and Accountability indicator measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government; 
includes freedom of expression; of association; and the existence and degree of a free media.  
The way to actualize this, includes engagement of civil societies and Non government 
organizations in election monitoring as it was done in many countries in the recent time 
(Nigeria, Ghana for example), enactment of the freedom of  the press bills. The Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism indicator measures the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilised by unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism. 
The Government Effectiveness indicator measures the quality of public services and capacity 
of civil services; the independence of the civil service from political pressures; and the 
quality of policy formulation. The Regulatory Quality evaluates the ability of the government 
to provide sound policies and regulations, which enable and promote private sector 
development. The Rule of Law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, including the quality of contract enforcement and property 
rights, the police and the courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence. Finally, Control of 
Corruption indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption and “capture” of the state by elites and 
private interests. For all these measures, the closer the value is to 1, the better the likelihood 
of better economic performance. As argued by Adams Smith. All these governance measures 
could be achieved through higher transparency of the government, by publishing its audited 
accounts, 
Some countries even now have good governance committees that includes civil societies, 
non- governmental organizations, international observers, international funding agencies and 
other relevant stakeholders that monitor the activities, programs and projects of the 
governments, this is in Nigeria, Ghana and Cote d’Ivorie. 
The indices for corruption and other governance indices were drawn from the PRS group and 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank for the period 2002-2009 while the 
real GDP per capita growth were obtained from World Bank Database. In all, we have 47 
SSA countries in the sample (see appendix 1). The choice of these countries was premised on 
the fact that all existing indicators of wealth of nations and wellbeing of their citizens have 
long established that African countries particularly SSA have performed poorly compared to 
other regions of the world.  Publications such as the World Development Report (World 
Bank, 2006), the World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2005) and UNDP Human Development 
Report (UNDP, 2007) have emphasised Africa’s dismal economic record along several 
dimensions. For example, the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2007) asserted that all the 
twenty-two countries deemed to have low levels of human development were from the 
African region. 
 
Discussion of Empirical Results 
The data sets are summarised in Table I below, which provides the definition and source of 
each variable, summary statistics and sample period. The correlation matrix between the 
variables is also provided in Table II. These indices were obtained from ICRG and 
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Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank as used in many previous empirical 
studies to measure corruption and Governance (see Kaufmann et al., 2009; World Bank, 
2009). The definition of these variables is contained in appendix 2. 
 
 
Table I: Summary of Dataset Used (Annual Data: 2002 - 2009)  
 
Variables Definition of 
Variables 
Unit of 
measurement 
Sources 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
LAW Rule of law World 
Governance 
Indicator 
(WGI) 
0.46 0.15 0.06 0.88 
ACCT Voice and 
accountability 
World 
Governance 
Indicator 
(WGI) 
0.39 0.17 0 0.83 
POSV Political 
stability and 
absence of 
violence 
World 
Governance 
Indicator 
(WGI) 
0.61 0.19 0 1 
EFF Government 
effectiveness 
World 
Governance 
Indicator 
(WGI) 
0.43 0.15 0.11 0.85 
REG Regulatory 
quality 
World 
Governance 
Indicator 
(WGI) 
0.46 0.17 0.06 0.95 
COR Control of 
corruption 
World 
Governance 
Indicator 
(WGI) 
0.39 0.16 0 0.88 
GDP Real GDP per 
capita growth 
rate 
World 
Development 
Indicator 
(WDI) 
6.61 1.25 0 10.24 
Sources: Authors’ computation 
From table 1,  for the period under review, the region has achieved most in terms of political 
stability, as this records an average of 0.61, where as the region has performed least in terms 
of control of corruption and voice  and accountability with each being 0.39 out of maximum 
of 1. Apart from political stability measure, at an average, all the governance measures were 
less than 0.5, this suggests that at an average the region is still having a weak governance 
structure and this has its impacts on the growth and development in the region.  
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Table II: Correlation Matrix of the Variables 
Variables LAW ACCT POSV EFF REG COR GDP 
LAW 1.000       
ACCT 0.659 1.000      
POSV 0.6862 0.5275 1.000     
EFF 0.6893 0.8081 0.5569 1.000    
REG 0.6462 0.6737 0.5255 0.7070 1.000   
COR 0.6239 0.4023 0.4813 0.5984 0.4628 1.000  
GDP 0.4050 0.3573 0.4846 0.3965 0.5880 0.2634 1.000 
 
  Table II gives the correlation matrix, it signifies the degree of association among the 
variable of interest. A positive (negative) sign also indicates positive (negative) relationship 
among them; the size also indicates the magnitude of the relationship.  In all there is a 
positive relationship among the variables, though the size differs. Relationship between voice 
and accountability shows the highest degree of association in the region (0.808), whereas the 
relationship between control of corruption and measure of economic growth shows the least 
degree of association (0.263). the most effective governance indicator in terms of its 
relationship with economic growth is regulatory quality (REG)  with 0.588, followed by the 
absence of political violence and political stability measure (POSV) with 0.485. in all, it can 
be observed that all variables display considerable variations justifying the use of panel 
estimation techniques.  
The estimation results are presented in Tables III to VII (see appendix 3). Most of the 
diagnostics in both tables are satisfactory. Both the R
2
 and F-test suggest high predictive 
ability of the independent variables and overall goodness of fit for the models. 
Three estimation methods were used. These were the fixed effect, random effect and 
maximum likelihood method. Also, four different model specifications were estimated. 
Model 1 presents the estimation results for the first model where the growth equation has 
only one independent variable (that is, control of corruption). Model 2 gives the estimation 
results of the growth equation with other determinants (governance/institutional factors), 
model 3 has the results for the interaction term of both the rule of law and voice and 
accountability, as well as control of corruption and regulatory quality while model 4 has the 
squared term to verify the existence of the efficient grease hypothesis. 
 
Model 1  
Focusing on model 1, the three estimation techniques report that an effective control of 
corruption would impact positively on the SSA economies. It suggests that 1 unit change in 
control of corruption, would lead to 0.83 unit change in the rate of economic growth in these 
countries. The coefficient of control of corruption is positive and statistically significant at 1 
percent. This is in consonance with the a priori expectation and in line with the findings of 
Henisz (2000) that control of corruption increases the probability of investment and hence 
growth.  However, the R
2 
is low, 0.07, suggesting that the variable can only explain 7 per cent 
of variation on the economic growth. Thus, more explanatory variables were added and the 
emerging trend was observed. 
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Model 2 
In the second estimation, both political stability and regulatory quality indicators entered the 
model with positive signs, and are statistically significant at 5%. This indicates that for the 
period under review, the region has had more reforms in terms of the two above, and this has 
impacted positively on the regional economic growth. This is also consistent with the result 
from the correlation matrix which suggests that both governance measures have high degree 
of association with the measure of economic growth in the region. 
 However, the region has got to do more policy reforms on government effectiveness as this 
variable entered the model with a negative sign. There was no sufficient empirical evidence 
to suggest that other governance indicators impact on these economies for the period under 
review.  Both the rule of law and the voice and accountability indicators did not show any 
statistically significant impact on economic growth for the period under review 
With the inclusion of other institutional/governance variables in model 2, the R
2
 improves to 
0.378, and the overall fitness of the model, F-test, rejects the null hypothesis of non-
significance of the model even at 1 per cent level. However, the coefficient of control of 
corruption is still positive but statistically not significant. The rule of law is also negative and 
statistically not significant. The voice and accountability variable is positive but not 
significant at 5 per cent level. However, Political stability and absence of violence is positive 
and statistically significant at 5 per cent suggesting a direct relationship with economic 
growth. On the contrary, government effectiveness is negative but significant at 5 per cent 
implying an inverse relationship with economic growth. Regulatory quality is positive and 
significant at 5 per cent level. Thus, in model three, an interaction term of both the rule of law 
and voice and accountability. These interaction terms were allowed to enter as separate 
independent variables in the growth equation. 
 
Model 3 
This is the model with the interaction terms; again political stability, regulatory quality  and 
government effectiveness indicators have been statistically significant at 5% level, though the 
signs are different. While the former two emerge with positive signs, the third came with a 
negative sign. The result further suggests that political stability and regulatory quality  in the 
region have   positive impacts on economic growth in the region, the government 
effectiveness has been seen to impact negatively on the regional economic growth, this  
further suggests   that  the  quality of the public services in the region is sub-optimal to elicit 
the desirable growth enhancing effect, and that  this poses  a great challenge to the economic 
growth in the region. Thus in terms  of policy implication, the governments in the region need 
to strengthen its policies on political stability and regulatory qualities, while they need to 
review  and try to improve  on their  efforts in improving on government effectiveness. 
With the interaction term for both the rule of law and voice and accountability 
(ACCT*LAW), the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 5 per cent, suggesting 
that efforts at improving both variables simultaneously could have more positive impacts on 
growth. This is in consonance with the a priori expectation.  This also indicates that the two 
measures are complementary, and that their simultaneous effects would have positive impacts 
on the economy. However, the interaction term between the control of corruption and 
regulatory quality was not statistically significant at  both 1% or 5% levels. 
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The results obtained are consistent for all the estimation techniques used, this further 
confirms the robustness of the techniques employed in the study. Where, the interaction term 
is statistically significant, the study goes further to assess the marginal effect of the term on 
economic growth in the region as well as the short run analysis. 
 
The Marginal Effects of Some Governance Indicators on Economic Growth in Sub-
Saharan African Countries 
To further analyse the effect of governance on economic growth in SSA, marginal effects of 
the interaction between the voice and accountability index and the rule of law variable (i.e. 
Acct*Law) were calculated so as to assess their joint effect on economic growth in the 
region. This  is done  through the  partial derivatives of equation 3 with respect to the two 
pair of policies above (using model 3 – the model with the interaction term). The marginal 
effect is obtained by taking the coefficient of the interaction term where it is significant at 
conventional 5% level. In cases, where the estimated parameter is not significant at the 5% 
level, a zero value was assigned to the parameter. The results of this exercise are presented in 
Table VII (in appendix 4) which gives the short-run effects of simultaneous policy reforms 
and its impact on economic growth in the region. Table VII (in appendix 4) gives the short 
run effects of each policy reform while holding the other constant. The minimum, maximum 
and mean values in Table I were used for the computation. While the minimum, maximum 
and mean indicate the minimum short run value, maximum short run effect and average short 
run effect respectively. However, for the constraint of space, the column under the mean 
value is discussed in the study. 
The result suggests that the marginal effect of voice and accountability index holding the rule 
of law constant, would impact more  on economic growth in the region with  at an average  of 
1.27 times. However, if the respective countries actively pursue policy at enhancing the rule 
of law, while holding voice and accountability constant, the resultant effect is that the 
regional economy would grow about 1.08 times more, if they have not pursued such policies. 
The implication of these results is that both the voice and accountability and rule of law 
indicators impact positively on economic growth in the region. Thus, any policy reform that 
focuses on these two, would lead to more positive impact on growth in the region. 
In the light of the foregoing results, governments in these countries need to pursue active 
policies that would strengthen accountability, regulatory quality and the rule of law if they 
have to enhance economic growth in their respective countries.  
 
Policy Implications 
From the results of this study, both political stability and high regulatory quality in the region 
have the growth enhancing features and government effectiveness indicator has a growth 
retarding feature in the region. There are no sufficient empirical evidence to support that the 
other governance indicators impact significantly on economic growth in the region. The 
policy implication that  can be inferred or drawn from this study, is that policy makers in the 
region should  strengthen its policies  at achieving political stability and regulatory quality. 
This can be done through setting up of many ombudsman commission for dispute resolutions, 
avoidance of unconstitutional practices or actions, promotion of  civic education, ensuring 
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even regional development,  promotion  of enabling environment for private sector 
development through access to finance, encouragement of private-public initiatives among 
others.  The governments also need to improve the quality of public services, promote  civil 
service independence  or autonomy and enhance consistency of policy formulations as these 
are necessary to engender public confidence and improve  the economic activities in the 
region. 
Suggestion for Further Research 
The study at present is still exploratory and the conclusion from the study is at best 
suggestive. Further research can probe further why the rules of law, accountability and 
control of accountability have not had much significant impact on economic growth.  This 
study explores a regional perspective, and it is obvious that these countries do not have 
similar development pace, while Botswana, South Africa and Seychelles are sometimes 
considered as middle-Income  group,  Burundi, Niger, Mali are  considered as low income 
group, may be future studies can delineate them along income group for further analysis or 
simply engage a country specific analysis. Sub-Saharan Africa countries have several sub-
regional affiliations, ECOWAS, SADC, UEMOA etc, thus other studies can also analyse the 
impact of governance on economic growth exploring these different regional groups. 
 
Conclusion 
The debate on the effects of corruption on macro-economic performance remains polarised. 
While some writers have claimed that corruption stifles economic growth and development, 
others have contended that, in some situations, corruption may be economically desirable 
because it provides a way out of inefficient regulations and bureaucratic bottlenecks.  
In all, most economies attempt to reduce the level of corruption, by embracing high 
governance. This is an empirical study that investigates the impact of governance measures 
on economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
It employs a panel econometric approach, and used three estimation techniques, fixed effects, 
Random effects and maximum likelihood estimation technique.  
The study found that political stability and regulatory quality indicators have growth 
enhancing features, as they impact on economic growth in the region significantly, while 
government effectiveness impacts negatively on the economic growth in the region. Despite, 
several anti-corruption policies in the region, the impact of corruption control on economic 
growth is not very obvious.  The study also found that simultaneous implementation of 
accountability and rule of law indicators has more positive impact on economic growth in the 
region. Both policies are complementary, and hence can be pursued simultaneously. 
The results suggest that reform efforts that aim at enhancing accountability, regulatory 
quality, political stability and the rule of law have more growth enhancing features and thus 
should be given more priority, than reform efforts that singly address the issue of control of 
corruption, since corruption in the region tends to be endemic, systemic and ubiquitous. The 
impact of such reform efforts on economic growth may not have a short run effect but a long 
run impact. 
Finally, this study has only considered the impact of control of corruption and other 
governance indicators on economic growth in the region while it has held other growth 
determinants (such as capital stock, human capital and financial development) constant so as 
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to deeply analyse the impact of the variables of interest in the model, this might have had 
some effects on the accuracy of the model and the precision of the estimates. It is therefore 
suggested that future studies could incorporate these other growth determinants in their 
assessments.  
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Appendix 1: List of SSA Countries Used in the Study 
 
 
 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic 
Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo Democratic Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eriteria, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho ,Liberia, 
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda,Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,  Seychelles, Sierra-Leone, South Africa, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia,  Zimbabwe 
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Appendix 2: Table III-VI Corruption and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa Economies 
Table III: Model 1 
Model 1 
Dependent 
variable real 
GDP 
Fixed effect Random effect Maximum likelihood 
 Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Constant 6.29*** 
(0.16) 
6.22***
 
(0.22) 
6.217*** 
(0.22) 
Corruption 0.83** 
(0.41) 
1.00** 
(0.38) 
0.83** 
(0.41) 
 
Table IV: Model 2 
                                                                     Model 2 
Dependent 
variable real 
GDP 
Fixed effect Random effect Maximum likelihood 
 Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Constant 5.07*** 
(0.36) 
5.06*** 
(0.36) 
4.71*** 
(0.31) 
Corruption 0.52 
(0.42) 
0.42 
(0.41) 
0.42 
(0.40) 
Rule of law -0.01 
(0.63) 
-0.09 
(0.59) 
-0.10 
(0.58) 
Political 
stability and 
absence of 
violence 
0.91** 
(0.42) 
1.18*** 
(0.39) 
1.18 
(0.39) 
Voice and 
accountability 
0.82* 
(0.49) 
0.64 
(0.47) 
0.64 
(0.46) 
Regulatory 
quality 
2.20*** 
(0.70) 
2.87*** 
(0.59) 
2.88***(0.59) 
Government 
effectiveness 
-1.28* 
(0.70) 
-1.23* 
(0.66) 
-1.23* 
(0.65) 
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Table V: Model 3 
                                                                     Model 3 
Dependent 
variable real 
GDP 
Fixed effect Random effect Maximum likelihood 
 Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Constant 5.13*** 
(0.48) 
5.03*** 
(0.45) 
5.03*** 
(0.44) 
corruption 1.66 
(1.04) 
0.63 
(0.97) 
0.69 
(0.98) 
Rule of law -1.20 
(0.79) 
-1.09 
(0.75) 
-1.10 
(0.74) 
Political 
stability and 
absence of 
violence 
0.87** 
(0.42) 
1.18*** 
(0.38) 
1.16*** 
(0.39) 
Government 
effectiveness 
-1.39** 
(0.68) 
-1.44** 
(0.64) 
-1.44** 
(0.64) 
Regulatory 
quality 
2.99*** 
(0.97) 
2.99*** 
(0.89) 
3.01*** 
(0.88) 
Acct * law 2.77*** 
(0.96) 
2.27** 
(0.93) 
2.31** 
(0.92) 
Corr*reg -2.55 
(2.03) 
-0.51 
(1.91) 
-0.62 
(1.91) 
 
Table VI: Model 4 
                                                                     Model 4 
Dependent 
variable real 
GDP 
Fixed effect Random effect Maximum likelihood 
 Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
constant 5.38*** 
(0.46) 
5.15*** 
(0.42) 
5.15*** 
(0.42) 
corruption 0.93 
(1.37) 
0.43 
(1.32) 
0.43 
(1.31) 
Rule of law -0.08 
(0.63) 
-0.12 
(0.58) 
-0.12 
(0.58) 
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Political 
stability and 
absence of 
violence 
0.97** 
(0.43) 
1.24*** 
(0.39) 
1.23*** 
(0.39) 
Government 
effectiveness 
-1.32* 
(0.70) 
-1.35** 
(0.66) 
-1.35** 
(0.65) 
Voice and 
accountability 
-1.44 
(1.17) 
-1.71 
(1.11) 
-1.71 
(1.10) 
Regulatory 
quality 
2.12*** 
(0.69) 
2.79*** 
(0.58) 
2.79*** 
(0.58) 
Acct
2 
3.05** 
(1.43) 
3.10** 
(1.34) 
3.10*** 
(1.32) 
Corr
2 
-0.60 
(1.52) 
-0.14 
(1.47) 
-0.15 
(1.46) 
 
Appendix 3 
Table VII: Marginal Effects of Corruption and Accountability on Economic growth in Some 
Selected SSA Countries 
Growth Effect Minimum Maximum Mean 
A) Regulatory Quality holding control of 
corruption constant 
2.99 2.99 2.99 
B) control of corruption holding  Regulatory 
Quality  constant 
0 0 0 
C) Accountability Indicator  holding  Rule of 
Law constant 
0 2.30 1.27 
D) Rule of Law   holding Accountability 
Indicator    constant  
0.17 2.44 1.08 
E)  Increase  in  Control of Corruption 0 0 0 
F)  Increase in Accountability 0 5.06 2.38 
 
